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Ever since Premack & Woodruff’s classic article1, which introduced the term 
“theory of mind”, researchers have claimed that strategic deception is the most 
natural behavioural consequence of understanding false belief. Here we challenge 
that claim, and provide evidence for the first time that the earliest manifestation of 
false belief understanding in human development is found in young children’s 
emerging pro-social behaviours. In a modified false belief task, children were 
asked either to choose one protagonist they should help to find the object (the pro-
social context), or to choose one they need to deceive so that none of the 
protagonists can find the object (the competitive context). The results show that 
the pro-social motive, but not the competitive motive, boosts early false belief 
understanding. This is most clearly contrasted with findings that apes, our closest 
living relatives, are capable of intentionally manipulating others by concealing 
information only under competitive motives, not under cooperative alternatives. 
Thus, the current findings are the strongest to date that sophisticated 
understanding of other’s belief in humans has its unique origin, separate from the 
primate origin at some point in recent evolution, when cooperative and 
communicative motives played an essential role for their survival. 
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There is a general consensus that only humans are capable of intentionally manipulating 
the psychological states of others, both for cooperative and competitive purposes. Other 
species may have contextually fixed behavioural associations which appear quite 
similar to deception or cooperation in human society2, 3, but most experimental evidence 
currently available suggests that such behaviours require little understanding of mental 
states, and occur only in a narrow range of contexts, such as competing for food4. The 
only known exception is apes, our closest evolutionary relative, reported to be capable 
of intentionally manipulating others’ perceptual states by concealing information, but 
even their capability is limited to function only competitive contexts, and not in 
cooperative contexts5,6,7,8. Intentional deception and cooperation in humans, by contrast, 
can occur in highly flexible contexts, and often require a sophisticated reading of others’ 
psychological states to be successful. Such sophisticated social intelligence, however, 
takes years to develop. Over 2 decades of research in theory of mind development 
suggests that sometime between 4 and 5 years of age, normally developing children of 
any country, culture and gender become capable of understanding false beliefs. 
Standard false belief tasks, which typical 3-year-olds would fail, have been widely 
recognized as a litmus test for developing theory of mind9, 10. 
 From the beginning, the concept of false belief has been predominantly 
associated with the act of deception, i.e. the act of creating false belief in someone’s 
mind11. Some researchers have suggested that development of children’s conceptual 
understanding of deception coincides with their understanding of false belief12, 13. 
Furthermore, according to one evolutionary hypothesis, it is the capability for complex 
social manipulation such as deception that caused the enlargement of the brain in 
primates14. More generally, the so-called “Machiavellian Intelligence” hypothesis 
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claims that sophisticated mind-reading ability in humans has its evolutionary origin in 
deliberate exploitation for personal gain15, 16.  
 The question of whether or how our motive to help others relates to our 
understanding of others’ mind, by contrast, has received surprisingly little attention until 
recently. Only during the last five years, was the possibility that our ability to read 
others’ mind might have evolved and developed to support cooperation and 
communication seriously considered17, 18, 19. For the evolutionary side of story, evidence 
has become available which indicates that social cognition in humans is geared to pro-
social activities such as cooperation and communication while the social intelligence of 
non-human primates functions better in a competitive situation 5, 6, 7, 8. For the 
developmental side of the story, several new findings suggest that spontaneous and 
robust pro-social and communicative actions are consistently produced by toddlers 
between 1 and 2 years old20, 21. For a preference for pro-social trait in others, even an 
earlier developmental root has been suggested more recently: a study revealed that at six 
month, infants prefer those who help others than someone who hinders others22. 
 What has been missing so far, however, is an experimental test which directly 
examines the link between children’s understanding of false belief and pro-social 
behaviors. In the present study, our hypothesis is that early theory of mind ability in 
human children is geared to cooperative and communicative purposes more strongly 
than it is to competitive or deceptive counterparts. If this is correct, children younger 
than four, who typically fail standard false belief tasks, should perform better in tasks 
where their understanding of false belief is mandatory to help others.   
 We introduce a novel paradigm based on the standard location change false 
belief task9, which we call the “Helping False Belief (FB) Task” and the “Deceiving 
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False Belief (FB) Task”. In order to create an appropriate setting for the child’s helping 
or deceiving act, some modifications to the standard location change task were 
necessary (Fig. 1). The key feature of the modified FB tasks is that the child’s 
understanding of false belief is assessed by his elicited non-verbal demonstration of 
choosing one protagonist over the other either (a) as the beneficiary of his help through 
indicating the true location of the object (in this case, the protagonist with a false belief 
should be chosen), or (b) as the victim of deception through deliberate misinforming of 
the object location (in this case, the protagonist with the true belief should be chosen). 
Two differently coloured boxes were used as the possible locations of the object, and 
the child was instructed to inform or misinform the true location of the object, by 
indicating the colour of the relevant box by means of showing a matching coloured 
ping-pong ball to the chosen protagonist. 
Sixty preschool children aged between 2;6 and 5;5, divided into three age 
groups, participated in the Helping FB Task, which was preceded by the Standard FB 
Task. Each condition consisted of three trials. A child scored one point (a) if the child 
made a correct prediction about where the protagonist with false belief will look for the 
object (Standard FB Task) or (b) if the child chose the protagonist with false belief to 
inform the true location of the object (Helping FB Task). In order to avoid the 
possibility that children’s choice of the protagonist is based on (a) attribution of 
ignorance, rather than false belief, or (b) some low-level cues such as the order of 
appearance (or their preference for the first appearing “victim” over the second 
appearing “bad guy”), a control session was also added, where (a) both protagonists end 
up being ignorant about the object transfer, and (b) the second appearing protagonist 
would always have the false belief about the location (Fig. 2). 
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The same number of children, aged between 2;7 and 5;5, participated in the 
Deceiving FB Task. The experimental procedure used in the Deceiving FB Task was 
exactly the same as the Helping FB Task, except for the following point: the 
experimenter and the child participant decided to keep the target objects to themselves, 
and the child was asked to deceive only one of the two protagonists so that eventually 
both protagonists end up failing to find the objects. The child received one point when 
he correctly chose the protagonist with true belief to misinform about the object 
location.  
Our rationale behind the experimental design was that children’s choice of the 
protagonist to help or deceive is based on their understanding of his belief state. More 
specifically, the task required the child (a) to attribute either false or true belief to each 
protagonist, and (b) to predict which one of the two protagonists is more likely to 
succeed or fail to search the correct location.  
 Mean scores for the Helping FB Task (Fig. 3) were compared by means of 3 
(age groups, n=20 for each group) x 2 (standard task vs. helping task) mixed factors 
ANOVA. It revealed the main effect of task [F(1,57)=99.97, p<.001] and age group 
[F(2,57)=4.80, p<.05], together with the interaction of the two variables [F(2,57)=3.34, 
p<.05]. Post-hoc tests revealed significantly better performance for the Helping Task 
than for the Standard Task. A comparison between the experimental and control group 
revealed that children’s choice of protagonist to help was not based on the attribution of 
ignorance, nor affected by the order of their appearance (p<.001) (Figure 4). Mean 
scores for the Deceiving Task (Fig. 3) were also analyzed by means of 3 (age groups, 
n=20 for each group) x 2 (standard task vs. deceiving task) mixed factors ANOVA. The 
main effect of task [F(1,57)=10.46, p<.01] and age group [F(2,57)=5.17, p<.05], 
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together with the interaction of the two variables [F(2,57)=4.00, p<.05] were obtained. 
Post-hoc tests revealed significantly better performance of 3- and 4-year-olds for the 
Deceiving Task than the Standard Task.  
 Overall, the results indicate that younger children in particular performed better 
in the newly introduced FB tasks, i.e. the Helping and the Deceiving Task, than the 
Standard Task. We speculate three possible reasons for this. First, to choose the right 
“protagonist” in response to the new target question may have been easier for them than 
to choose the right “location” in response to the standard target question, as they were 
less likely to be affected by the reality bias (i.e. their knowledge about the current object 
location) in the former. More generally, false belief tasks which do not elicit any 
explicit response concerning the location are considered to be more appropriate to tap 
younger children’s false belief reasoning, for similar reasons23, 24, 25. Second, in the new 
FB tasks, false belief understanding was situated in a social context, where it may be 
easier for children to relate to protagonists’ mental states more naturally18, 26. Third, the 
very need for comparing and contrasting the mental states of the two protagonists to 
pick the one to help or the one to deceive, may have been another contributing factor for 
their successful performance27.  
 Ultimately, the most important finding in the current study lies in the 
comparison between children’s performance in the Helping FB Task and in the 
Deceiving FB Task, the two tasks that involved identical methodological manipulation 
except for the contrast in the child’s target action. Children’s performance in all three 
age groups in the Helping FB Task was significantly higher than a chance level of 50 % 
(all t’s > 3.58, all p’s ≤ .002, two-tailed t-test). By contrast, children performed at or 
close to a chance level in the Deceiving FB Task (all t’s < .72, all p’s > .48, n.s.). 
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Furthermore, a 2 (helping task vs. deceiving task) x 3 (age groups, n=20 for each group) 
ANOVA yielded significant main effect of task [F(1,114)=17.42, p<.01], but no main 
effect of age group or the interaction of the two variables, indicating a significantly 
better performance for the Helping Task than the Deceiving Task.  
 The finding is important in several ways, particularly when compared with the 
findings of meta-analysis of 178 false-belief test results10. The meta-analysis has 
revealed that a deceptive motive enhanced the performance of children of all ages, 
though it has never brought 3-year-olds’ performance to above chance level. The result 
of the Deceiving FB Task in the present study confirms the trend. No other social 
motives that might enhance younger children’s performance are mentioned in the meta-
analysis, and it was concluded that no task manipulations which have been included in 
the meta-analysis produced above-chance level performance in the youngest children. 
As the present study clearly shows, however, pro-social motives in the Helping FB Task 
boosted 3-year-olds’ grasp of protagonist’s false belief to above-chance level. The 
finding strongly suggests that false belief understanding may be sensitive to different 
social or communicative contexts, and that pro-social motives may be particularly 
suitable to elicit younger children’s natural ability to understand others’ mind.  
 Our findings thus support the evolutionary hypothesis that human social 
intelligence has evolved to emphasize and appreciate the benefit of cooperation more 
than that of competition, which has traditionally been regarded as a “poor cousin of 
Machiavellianism”28. Of course, we are not denying that human beings are not only 
cooperative, but also extremely competitive. What the current study reveals is that a 
strong pro-social trait in early childhood is not the sign of indiscriminate or naïve trust 
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of others, but is more likely to be a uniquely human ontological pathway into more 
sophisticated understanding of complex social interactions.   
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Supplementary Methods is linked to the online version of the paper at www.nature.com/nature. 
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Figure Captions 
 
Figure 1. Actions shown in (A) Standard FB Task, (B) Helping FB Task, and (C) 
Deceiving FB Task. 
 
Figure 2. Actions shown in the control condition of the Helping FB Task. 
 
Figure 3. Mean scores across the Helping FB Task and the Deceiving FB Task 
for three age groups. 
 
Figure 4. Mean scores of the Helping FB Task in the experimental (where the 
first appearing puppet has false belief) and control conditions (where the 
second appearing puppet has false belief). 
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Figure 2. 
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Figure 3. 
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Figure 4. 
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Supplementary Information for 
Pro-Social Motivation Promotes Early Understanding of False Belief 
 
Supplementary Methods 
 
Helping Location-Change FB Task 
Participants 
Sixty children participated in the Helping FB Task: 20 children between the age of 2;6-
3;5 (M=3;0), 20 children between 3;6-4;5 (M=4;0), and 20 children between 4;6-5;5 
(M=5;0). An additional 20 children between the age of 2;6-3;5 (M=3;0) were added as a 
control group. Children were recruited from kindergartens and nursery schools in 
Inuyama-city, Aichi prefecture. The numbers of male and female children in each group 
were approximately the same.  
 
Materials 
Boxes of different colours, ping-pong balls of the same colours, and small-sized objects 
that are familiar to children (e.g. flower, cup, candy) were used. Pairs of puppet 
characters were used to show the false belief stories in front of the child participant. 
 
Design and Procedure 
Children were tested individually in a quiet room at their kindergarten/nursery school, 
or in our laboratory room that was furnished to create a child-friendly environment. The 
participant and an experimenter were seated in front of a table, and a puppet player was 
seated across the table, facing the child and the experimenter.  
   Participants were given two experimental conditions, the Standard FB task and the 
Helping FB Task, each consisted of three trials. Children first were engaged in the 
Standard FB Task and then proceed to the Helping FB Task. The test session of the 
Helping FB Task was preceded by a short practice session, where the participant learned 
the basic protocol of helping a puppet with a given material (a coloured ping-pong ball). 
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The whole session, which lasted for 20-30 minutes for each child, was videotaped. The 
child’s responses were kept in a log by the experimenter. 
 
Standard Location-Change FB Task 
The task basically followed the Standard Location Change False Belief Task. A child 
participant saw the following sequence of events. Puppet A puts an item into one of the 
two boxes on the table and disappears. Puppet B then comes in and transfers the item 
into the other box. After Puppet B’s exit, the experimenter asked the child three 
confirmation questions: (a) Where is the item now?, (b) Who put it in the box?, and (c) 
Which box had the other character put it in? If the child’s answer was wrong, the 
experimenter reviewed the story and corrected the mistake, so their possible subsequent 
failure in the experimental question would not be caused by a lack of false belief 
understanding. After the confirmation questions, Puppet A comes back and states that 
he is going to get “the item” (an apple, a ball, and etc). The experimenter then asked the 
test question: “Which box will Puppet A search to get the item?” The child’s answer 
was counted as correct if the child chose the box which Puppet A initially put the item 
in. 
 
Helping FB Task 
(a) Practice session 
Before the testing session, the child participated in a practice session to get familiarized 
with some basic protocols of helping action required in the main task. Four different 
scenes were acted out in front of the child.  
Scene 1: The experimenter placed a toy food item inside one of the two boxes on the 
table. The two boxes were differently coloured, and the experimenter picked up the 
matching coloured ping-pong balls from a bowl to show to the child. The child was 
asked to pick the ping-pong ball whose colour matches the colour of the box containing 
the food. A puppet then appeared and stated that he was very hungry. The experimenter 
told the child that he can help the hungry puppet find the food, and then said “Let’s help 
him by giving this ping-pong ball. He would know that there’s something in the box 
which has the same colour as the ping-pong ball”. Having received the ball from the 
child, the puppet reached the target box, and found the food.  
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Scene 2: After a toy food item was placed inside one of the boxes and the colour-
matched ping-pong ball was picked up, a puppet came in and stated that he was hungry. 
However, this time, the puppet immediately proceeded to open the empty box and 
became clearly disappointed. The child was then given the ping-pong ball and 
encouraged to help the disappointed puppet. Having received the ball, the puppet 
reached the other box and found the food.  
Scene 3: The experimenter placed two toy food items in the middle of the two boxes. A 
puppet appeared and put the two items in one of the boxes and disappeared. Then 
another puppet came up and transferred the two items to the other box. The 
experimenter asked the child three questions: (a) Where are the items now?, (b) Who 
put them in the box?, and (c) Which box had the other character put them in? Then the 
child was asked to pick up the ping-pong ball whose colour matched the colour of the 
box containing the items. The two puppets came back one after another and each stated 
that he was going to get one of the two items. The item chosen by each puppet was 
different, and if one puppet said “I’m gonna get an apple”, the other said “I’m gonna get 
an orange”, for example. The puppet who didn’t know about the transfer of the items 
opened the empty box and cried, while the puppet which transferred them opened the 
right box and found the item. After the disappointed puppet went away in tears, the 
experimenter said, “Oh, I forgot about this ball. If we had given this ball to him, he 
could have found the item. I’m sorry that we couldn’t, but next time maybe we should 
remember how to help someone like him.”  
Scene 4: The same story as the Scene 3 was acted out, but this time, before the 
disappointed puppet disappears, the child was encouraged to help him. The 
experimenter gave the ball to the child and said, “Oh, he has opened the empty box 
mistakenly. Maybe we should help him. Give this ball to him and then he will know 
where he can find the item.” Having received the ball from the child, the disappointed 
puppet went to the right location and found the target item. The other puppet also found 
his item on his own. 
(b) Test session 
After the practice session, the child proceeded to the test session, which consisted of 
three trials. The experimenter placed two toy items in the middle of the two boxes. A 
puppet appeared and put the two items in one of the boxes and disappeared. Then 
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different puppet came up and transferred the two items to the other box. The 
experimenter asked the child three questions: (a) Where are the items now?, (b) Who 
put them in the box?, and (c) Which box had the other character put them in? Then the 
child was asked to pick up the ping-pong ball whose colour matched the colour of the 
box containing the items. The two puppets came back one after another and each stated 
that he was going to get one of the two items. The item chosen by each puppet was 
different. At this point, the experimenter said to the child, “One of them may go to the 
wrong box and get disappointed, and so maybe we should help him! Please give this 
ball to him so that he will know the right location!” The child was required to choose 
the puppet which is more likely to fail to find the item he wanted, in order to help him.  
(c) Control group 
20 children (M=3;0) participated in a control session, which was designed to test (a) if 
children’s choice of puppet to help is based on attribution of ignorance, rather than false 
belief, or (b) if the order of the two puppets’ appearance influenced children’s choice of 
the puppet. In the test session, as in the standard location-change false belief tasks, it 
was always the first appearing puppet which ended up being both ignorant about the 
object transfer and having a false belief about the location of the toy items. Hence, the 
possibility remained that the children’s correct choice of puppet to help is not due to 
their careful consideration of puppets’ belief states, but to attribution of ignorance, or to 
a blind choice of the puppet which appears first (or their preference for the first 
appearing “victim” over the second appearing “bad guy”). To counterbalance the order 
of appearance and having false belief, as well as controlling knowledge/ignorance of 
object transfer, the control session was set up so that the second appearing puppet would 
always have a false belief about the location, while both puppets are ignorant about the 
object transfer. This was achieved by the addition of the following step to the story in 
the test session: after the second appearing puppet transferred the toy items and 
disappeared, the experimenter transferred them back to the original location. In this 
way, although neither puppet knew about the second transfer of the items, the first 
appearing puppet ended up with correct belief, and the second appearing puppet with 
false belief, about their location. Children who participated in the control session also 
performed the standard FB task first, which was immediately followed by a practice 
session customized for the control session. 
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Deceiving Location-Change FB Task 
Participants 
Sixty children participated in this study; 20 children between the age of 2;7-3;5 
(M=3;1), 20 children between 3;6-4;5 (M=4;1), and 20 children between 4;6-5;5 
(M=5;0). The numbers of male and female children in each group were approximately 
the same. They were recruited from kindergartens and nursery schools in Inuyama-city, 
Aichi prefecture. 
 
Materials 
Materials used in the Deceiving FB Task were same as in the Helping FB Task: 
coloured boxes, coloured ping pong balls and small-sized objects familiar to children.. 
 
Design and procedure 
The basic design of the Deceiving FB Task was the same as the Helping FB Task: 
participants were given two types of false belief tasks; Standard Location-Change FB 
Task and Deceiving FB Task, each consisted of three trials. Children first participated in 
the Standard FB Task, which was followed by a short practice session and a testing 
session of the Deceiving FB Task. The whole session lasted about 20-30 minutes for 
each child. The child’s response was kept in a log by the experimenter and whole 
session was videotaped. As we found no order effect to the choice of the puppet to help 
in the Helping FB Task, it was simply assumed that there would be no order effect in 
the Deceiving FB Task either, without any control task.  
(a) Practice session 
Children were familiarized with basic protocols of deceiving action required in the main 
task in the practice session. Four different scenes were acted out in front of the child.  
Scene 1: The experimenter placed a toy food item in one of the two boxes on the table. 
A puppet appeared and stated that he was hungry. The experimenter told the child that 
they want to keep the toy food to themselves, and that the puppet should not take it from 
them. After the child agreed, the experimenter suggested to the child that they should 
make the puppet search in the wrong box so that he cannot find the toy food. The child 
was asked to pick the ping-pong ball whose colour matches the colour of the empty box 
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on the table, and to give it to the hungry puppet. Having received the ping-pong ball, the 
puppet searched the empty box, and left the scene without finding the food.  
Scene 2: As in Scene 1, the experimenter put the toy food item in one of the two boxes 
on the table and suggested that if someone comes in and looks for food, they should 
guide him to the wrong location so that they can keep the food to themselves. The child 
prepared the ping-pong ball whose colour matched the colour of the empty box on the 
table. A puppet appeared and claimed that he was hungry, and the child was encouraged 
to give the ball to him. Having received the ping-pong ball, the puppet searched the 
empty box, and failed to find any food.  
Scene 3: The experimenter placed two toy food items in the middle of the two boxes. A 
puppet appeared and put the items in one of the boxes and disappeared. Another puppet 
came in and transferred the items to the other box. After the second puppet disappeared, 
the experimenter gave the three confirmation questions to the child. Then the child was 
asked to choose a ping-pong ball whose colour matched the colour of the box which is 
currently empty. The two puppets came back one after another, and each stated that he 
was going to get one of the two items. The puppet which transferred the items searched 
the right box and found the item he wanted, but the other one searched the wrong box 
and disappeared without finding the item he wanted. The experimenter then said, “Oh, I 
forgot about this ball. If we had given this ball to the puppet who took away our toy 
item, he couldn’t have found it. I’m sorry that we didn’t do it in time, but next time we 
should use the ball to keep the toy items to ourselves.”  
Scene 4: The same story as in the Scene 3 was acted out, but this time, the child was 
encouraged to give the ball to the puppet which approached the right box, to misinform 
him about the location. Having received the ball, the puppet went to the wrong box and 
failed to find the item he wanted. Meanwhile, the other puppet also searched the wrong 
box and failed to find the item he wanted. Thus, the child succeeded to keep the items to 
himself. 
(b) Test session 
After the practice session, the child proceeded to the test session. The experimenter 
placed two toy items in the middle of the two boxes on the table. A puppet appeared and 
put the two items in one of the boxes and disappeared. Then another puppet appeared 
and transferred the two items to the other box. The experimenter asked the child three 
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confirmation questions. The child was then asked to pick up a ping-pong ball whose 
colour matched the box that is currently empty. The two puppets came back one after 
the other and each stated that he was going to get one of the two items. At this point, the 
experimenter said to the child, “One of them may go to the right box and find the item 
he wants, but we don’t want it to happen. Please give this ball to him, so that he will 
search the wrong box!” The child was required to choose the puppet which is more 
likely to succeed to find the item he wanted, as the victim of his deception. 
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Figure 1.
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Figure 2. 
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Figure 3. 
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Figure 4. 
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